Abstract: This article shows how under the present legislation in the United Kingdom copyright may exist in speech, in particular in interviews and conversations, provided that the words are recorded and constitute an original work. The argument is illustrated and supported by reference to reported cases from throughout the common law world, as well as to news stories ranging from interviews with Lord Denning and Michael Jackson. Issues arising from the collection of oral history are also discussed. It is further argued that, in addition to the internal analysis of copyright itself, such protection for the spoken word can be justified by the privacy and personality interests of speakers in the use of what they say.
3 had been wrongly convicted of an IRA bombing outrage. Denning said that the Four had probably committed the bombings but that it could not be proved; and that retaining capital punishment would have prevented the problems arising. The interview was published verbatim in The Spectator magazine on 18 August; 3 one week later the journal published an apology to the Guildford Four from Denning, Wilson, the editor and the journal. 4 The publication of these three unconnected interviews and subsequent events made lawyers and the general public aware that the spoken word can have copyright, even when there is no preceding written text. The Bordes and Ogilvy interviews became the focal points of court actions for copyright infringements between the proprietors of the Daily Express and Today, to be discussed in detail later in this article, but in which it was recognised that the interviewees held copyright in what they had said to their interviewers. 5 No litigation arose from the Denning interview, but he was reported as having threatened legal action against interviewer and publisher,
commenting that 'what I said is my copyright and the use of the words was prohibited by me except in so far as I approved it'. 6 A N Wilson's subsequent letter of apology to Lord Denning, published in The Spectator in December 1990, revealed that the material sent to Denning for approval prior to publication had -through Wilson's apparent oversight -not included the remarks about the Guildford Four. 7 Until the passage of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, doubt existed as to the existence of copyright in the spoken word in the United Kingdom. Before the first general social links with Libyan officials at a time when Libya was regarded as a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom. 3 See The Spectator, 18 August 1990, 8-10 ('England, his England'). 4 See an Apology to the Guildford Four from Lord Denning, The Spectator, its then-editor Dominic Lawson, and A N Wilson at page 9 of the issue for 25 August 1990. 5 Express Newspapers plc v News (UK) Ltd [1990] FSR 359. See further below, text between notes 125-134. 6 See The Times, 10 September 1990. 5 also be recorded or fixed in some material form before any copyright will come into existence. 16 Each of these requirements thus needs elaboration in the context of protecting speech, while the rules about fixation also have slightly curious consequences. All this will be discussed in more detail later in this article, along with the limitations of the scope of the copyright thus conferred arising from the rights of others, in particular the fair dealing provisions of the copyright legislation.
Two other brief introductory points may be made about the copyright protection of the spoken word, to help define the scope of this article. First, the producers of sound recordings enjoy copyright in their product quite apart from any copyright that may exist for the author (if any) of the material recorded. But this article is concerned with the copyright in the message rather than the medium. Second, the article does not treat of performance rights, under which performers may enjoy protection against unauthorised recording of their live performances and have the power to prevent commercialisation of such recordings. 17 Performances include dramatic performances and readings and recitations of literary works; so the concept seems generally to envisage the prior existence of a work which is then performed, whereas our concern is with the content of unscripted, impromptu and extemporary speech. It would be possible, however, on the arguments of this paper, for extemporary speech to be a literary work as well as a performancefor example, the product of an ad-libbing stand-up comedian. 18 Although performance rights are growing closer in substance to copyright in many ways, distinctions still require to be made; and this paper will be primarily concerned with speech which could not be called performance without stretching the word into near-meaninglessness. copyright in the spoken word as distinct from copyright in the medium on which the speech has been recorded. 16 CDPA 1988, s 3(2); and see further below, text between notes 100-111. 17 Martin Bashir, included many extracts from interviews between the pair, leading to an unfavourable portrayal of certain aspects of Jackson's conduct towards children. Jackson then initiated an action against Granada Television, seeking inter alia possession of unbroadcast tapes of other material on the basis of his copyright therein. The last news of the action at the time of writing was that the parties had agreed that the material would not be broadcast or otherwise released pending the outcome of the case. 24 Whether the copyright claimed (perhaps as the result of some contractual arrangement between Granada and Jackson) lay in the tapes as sound recordings, or related to the words of Jackson himself as recorded on the tapes, remained unclear.
B Public speech
Spontaneous speech which is not the result of interview also plays an important role in broadcasting -for example, commentary on a live event, 25 Century-Fox Record Corporation. 26 The defendants were marketing commercially and without Dr King's consent phonograph records of the speech, when King himself had plans to exploit the work in a similar way. His action to prevent the circulation of the defendants' phonographs, based on infringement of copyright, was successful. The example is imperfect in relation to the arguments of this article, since apparently a script of the speech was written in advance, mainly for press release purposes. But the release was only substantially in the form of the speech later 8 delivered so, at least to some extent, the story does demonstrate something of the power, in both content and delivery, and the continuing commercial value, which extempore speech may have.
B Oral history
Another group much affected by copyright in the spoken word, the one through which I first began to think about such issues, is oral historians, whose basic technique is the sound-recording of the memories and recollections of living people for purposes of preservation in archives and use by researchers as historical evidence. Generally these memories and recollections are elicited through interviews, which may be filmed or videoed as well as sound recorded. 27 The interests of oral historians overlap with those of broadcasters, since oral history interviews, often combined with archive film and sound material, can make for memorable and sometimes very moving programmes on television and radio. The interviews may therefore be exploited for both academic and commercial purposes. Digitisation of the archives held by both academic and broadcasting organisations to enable dissemination of the material on the Internet extends the scope of such exploitation still further. 28 As a result, however, oral historians and those who broadcast such material are increasingly asking themselves questions about the rights of their interviewees in the material which they record.
The typical oral history interviewee is very different from the public personality or celebrity 25 Springs) , in which representatives of the local Pitjantjara people obtained an injunction to prevent the publication by an anthropologist of material of deep religious and cultural significance to the Pitjantjaras, which had been disclosed to the defendant under conditions of secrecy 35 years prior undergoing interview, inasmuch as the latter is generally attempting to convey not only information but also an image which will be of benefit to him, directly or indirectly, in shaping the way he and his activities are perceived by the public. By contrast, the oral history interviewee is usually much less sophisticated, being a genuinely private person talking about personal matters, perhaps revealing a considerable amount about herself, and possibly others with whom she has come in contact. An interviewer attempts to establish a conversational atmosphere in which the interviewee feels relaxed and confident, and the later publication of such material, whether in print, by broadcasting or commercial recording, or on the Internet, can sometimes seem morally inconsistent with the way in which it was obtained.
The potential moral difficulties are not limited to oral history interviews and recordings, as may be illustrated with a case decided in 1998 by the Irish Supreme Court. The question there was whether copyright existed in a 6-year-old child's oral retelling of stories from the Bible, recorded in class in 1961 by her teacher after the latter had first told the story in a simple version to her pupils.
The recordings had been rediscovered by a religious broadcaster in the 1990s, and published commercially, in a recording entitled 'Give up yer aul sins'. 29 The child, now an adult, had given no consent to, and received no reward from, this profitable exploitation of her efforts thirty years after the event. Had she been treated fairly or respectfully in this process? Recognition of a copyright in her words, with its concomitants of consent and the possibility of financial return, might go some way to achieving that fairness and respect. but its role is not limited to the support of markets in creativity. Aspects of the law, such as the lengthy period of protection (far exceeding anything which might be thought necessary to provide merely economic incentives to create), 30 and the moral rights of authors to be identified as such and to have the integrity of their works respected, 31 show that other considerations have been taken into account in its development. The 1988 Act already recognises a moral right to privacy in relation to photographs and films commissioned for private and domestic purposes, meaning that they may not be published, exhibited or broadcast without the commissioner's consent. 32 The principle informing this provision, it is suggested, should also underpin understanding and application of copyright in other contexts, of which speech is one, at least in some circumstances. The tapping of telephones and other forms of electronic eavesdropping have long been recognised as potentially infringements of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that 'everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence'. 35 The generality of this is limited by the Article, to allow activities directed to national security, the prevention of crime, and the protection of the rights of others, notably those under Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression). In the United Kingdom interception of communications through telecommunications systems is now subject to the 33 reproducing copies of the products of such interceptions. Such conduct has been held to be the tort of breach of confidence; 37 but arguably one of the elements of that tort, a relationship of confidence between the eavesdropper and the speaker, is missing in many such cases, 38 The Sun, the Commission took as its 'premise that eavesdropping into private telephone conversations -and then publishing transcripts of them -is one of the most serious forms of physical intrusion into privacy'. 40 The publication of Foster's family conversation was not justified 41 No consideration was given to the possibility that there had been an infringement of copyright.
B Privacy and copyright
In Wainwright v Home Office, 42 the House of Lords held that, at least prior to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the consequent domestication of the ECHR, English law knew no general right of privacy. 43 Instead privacy was protected only in specific areas, to be developed incrementally if at all, by both statute and the common law. In the post-ECHR case of Campbell v MGN Ltd, 44 the House developed the law of confidential information the better to protect privacy in accordance with Article 8 ECHR, but recognised that this would not capture all cases in which privacy was in issue -for example, in the strip-searching which was the subject of the Wainwright case. To recognise a role for copyright in the protection of privacy seems perfectly consistent with the Law Lords' piecemeal approach to the topic, although the possibility has not hitherto received much attention in the debate about privacy laws. 45 It certainly seems clear that Article 8 ECHR could reinforce any development of the law of copyright to protect speech from unauthorised reproduction and dissemination, with effect being given to the Article's self-imposed limitations through the exceptions to copyright, which may be generically described as fair dealing and public interest defences. 46 A Difficulties about protection of speech by copyright
B Concept of 'literary work'
Copyright is given to 'literary works'. The Berne Convention states in Article 2(1) that every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain is covered by copyright, whatever might be the mode or form of its expression, and gives a non-exhaustive list of examples which includes such basically oral works as 'lectures, addresses, sermons'. As Sam Ricketson notes, however, these are 'only spoken works of a more formal or considered kind delivered before or to an audience', and the Convention therefore does not require protection for 'more aleatory or spontaneous forms of oral expression', although 'it is open to member countries to extend protection to these kinds of work if they wish'. 47 It would appear from the French, German and Dutch legislation that the protection of oral works as such in these countries is confined to the formal production of the kind mentioned in Berne. 48 However, in the UK the specific protection of lectures, speeches and sermons was dropped in 1956, 49 and nothing in the 1988 Act limits the protection of speech to such set-pieces. Further, the question of whether a work is 'literary' is determined 'irrespective of .. 49 See above, text accompanying note 11. whether the quality or style is high'. 50 The adjective 'literary' means simply that a work should consist of words or writing which convey information or instruction, or give enjoyment in the form of literary pleasure. 51 However, the most obvious objection to copyright in the extempore spoken word is its frequent lack of form and substance, somewhat akin to the difficulties which have led the courts to deny copyright to single words, 52 book and film titles, 53 catch phrases, 54 newspaper headlines, 55 and word processing menu commands. 56 With conversation or dialogue between two or more people, further issues may arise from a lack of 'distinct, identifiable boundaries' 57 between the various contributions. In a context not involving speech, Canadian judges have argued that a work is something which generally is whole, complete or able to stand on its own, and that 'if a production is dependent upon surrounding materials such that it is rendered meaningless or its utility largely disappears when taken apart from the context in which it is disseminated, then that component will instead be merely a part of a work'. 58 Such considerations may well mean that individual questions and answers, or comments and responses, in an interview or a conversation, cannot enjoy copyright, since each of the contributions may be difficult or even impossible to understand without the other statements involved in the exchange. 50 Hotchner had published articles using such material in the same way, and Hemingway had approved of this practice. The estate argued that Hemingway's 'directly quoted comment, anecdote and opinion were his 'literary creations', his 'literary property', and that the defendant Hotchner's note-taking only performed the mechanics of recordation'. 63 The New York Court of Appeals noted a number of problems with the concept of copyright in conversational speech, including 'the difficulty of measuring the relative selfsufficiency of any one party's contribution to a conversation'. 64 But, said the Court of Appeals, speech is now easily captured by electronic devices and, consequently, we should be wary about excluding all possibility of protecting a speaker's right to decide when his words, uttered in private dialogue, may or may not be published at large. Conceivably, there may be limited and special situations in which an interlocutor brings forth oral statements from another party which both understand to be the unique intellectual product of the principal speaker, a product which would qualify for common-law copyright if such statements were in writing. 65 The court drew no specific conclusion on the facts before it, but instead went on to hold that Hemingway's conduct with regard to Hotchner's publications in his lifetime showed that authority to publish must be implied, so negativing the reservation of any common law copyright. The court said:
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Assuming, without deciding, that in a proper case a common-law copyright in certain limited kinds of spoken dialogue might be recognized, it would, at the very least, be required that the speaker indicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement and that he wished to exercise control over its publication … Such an indication is, of course, possible in the case of speech. It might, for example, be found in prefatory words or inferred from the circumstances in which the dialogue takes place. Another way of formulating such a rule might be to say that, although, in the case of most intellectual products, the courts are reluctant to find that an author has 'published', so as to lose his common-law copyright, … in the case of conversational speech -because of its unique nature -there should be a presumption that the speaker has not reserved any common-law rights unless the contrary strongly appears. 66 Nimmer on Copyright, the standard work on US law, is critical of the tests proposed in Hemingway for the identification of an oral work protectable by copyright: 67 It is most unfortunate to introduce the concept that only a 'unique intellectual product' may command common law copyright protection. This suggests a standard of creativity, or of novelty, or of both, that is contrary to prevailing copyright standards, and that has no greater justification in oral than it does in written works. Further, to require that the speaker 'indicate' that he claims copyright in his expression is to create the need for a kind of oral copyright notice that is difficult to justify. A commendable aspect of common law However different or unique plaintiff's thoughts or opinions may be, the expression of these opinions or thoughts is too general and abstract to rise to the level of a literary or intellectual creation that may enjoy the protection of copyright. Although the general subject matter of the interview may have been outlined in the reporters' minds prior to their meeting with plaintiff, the actual dialogue, including the unprepared responses of plaintiff, was spontaneous and proceeded in a question and answer format. There is no defined segregation, either by design or implication, of any of plaintiff's expression of his thoughts and opinions on the subjects discussed which would aid in identifying plaintiff's 68 723 F 2d 195 (1983) . 69 723 F 2d at 206. 70 521 F Supp 1204 (1981) . 71 Ibid, at 1207. Note the comment of Nimmer, § 2.02, note 37.1: 'The fear thus expressed is, to say the least, exaggerated. Celebrities are not likely generally to object to the public reporting of their statements, and, in any event, the usual brief quotations would, in most cases, not constitute copyright infringement. … Where an extensive interview is quoted, it is likely that the speaker previously consented to the publication of the interview.' purported copyright material. 72 Once again, however, Nimmer is critical of the tests applied: 'if the response had been reduced by the speaker to writing, there can be no doubt that the result would have commanded statutory copyright protection, without the need to pass any qualitative test as to the 'literary' or 'intellectual' content.' 73 Hesitations like those of the US courts are also apparent in Canadian cases. In respect of Gould's mother and on vacation in the Bahamas -was such that it was intended to be casual, to catch the spontaneity of Gould when he was relaxing. The conversation between the two men was the kind that Gould would have with a friend. Indeed Gould and Carroll remained friends for a short while afterwards. Gould was not delivering a structured lecture or dictating to Carroll. Rather, Carroll engaged Gould in easygoing conversation out of which emerged comments which provided insights into Gould's character and personal life. Gould was making offhand comments … This is not the kind of discourse which the Copyright Act intended to protect. 76 But the Ontario Court of Appeal, while agreeing with the conclusion that Gould had no copyright -'it is evident from this record that Gould did not have a copyright with respect to his oral utterances or in the 'transcriptions' of them' 77 -went on to hold that the interviewer Carroll had a copyright in his record of his dialogue with Gould: 'Carroll as the author of the text and captions in the book was the owner of the copyright in the very written material the appellants are attempting to suppress. … The person who makes notes or report of the speech is the author of the report and obtains copyright in the report.' 78 And this approach was followed by Reed J in the Federal Court of Canada in Hager v ECW Press Ltd, 79 a case concerned with the copying of quotations from the country singer Shania Twain, first obtained in an interview with, and then published by, Barbara Hager, from whose book the defendant reproduced them in his own later biography of Twain. Hager was found to have a copyright which the defendant had infringed.
The issues of authorship and ownership in relation to recorded and published quotations raised in these cases will be discussed later in this article. 80 At the present stage of the argument, the significance of Gould Estate and Hager is that both ultimately recognise the possibility that an interview may give rise to a literary work capable of attracting copyright, albeit only for the person recording or fixing the whole interview in writing. But Lederman J's statement in Gould Estates that 'A person's oral statements in a speech, interview or conversation are not recognized in that form as literary creations' is not upheld by the Court of Appeal, and was not in any event supported by the citation given, which was to the old English House of Lords decision, Walter v Lane. 81 That case concerned the copyright in verbatim reports in The Times newspaper of five public speeches made by Lord Rosebery, but, as will again be discussed in more detail later in this article, 82 the claim to copyright was made, not by the speech-maker, but by The Times. Indeed, Lord Rosebery was not involved in the case, and his rights, if any, were carefully excluded from consideration by the majority of the court. It is true that Lord Davey remarked: 'There is no copyright in a speech although delivered on a public occasion', 83 while Lord Brampton said: 'if no reporters had been present, or if though present none had taken down his Lordship's utterances, those utterances would have remained unrecorded, and no question of copyright could have arisen, for there would have been no subject of copyright in existence.' 84 The context of these comments, however, is that the copyright legislation in force at the time (1900) conferred literary copyright only upon the authors of 'books', and copyright was the right to multiply copies of a published writing. 85 Apart from the Lectures Copyright Act 1835 (which was inapplicable in this case), there was indeed no question of statutory copyright in a purely oral production as the law then stood in the United Kingdom. The possibility of 'common law copyright' in an unpublished work 86 was also precluded, since Lord Rosebery gave his speeches on public occasions in front of journalists, impliedly authorising further dissemination. 79 [1999] 2 FC 287. 80 See below, text accompanying notes 112-141. 81 [1900] AC 539 at 557-558, 559. 82 See below, text accompanying notes 122-123. 83 [1900] AC at 550. 84 Ibid at 557. 85 Literary Copyright Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict, c 45), ss 2 and 3. The bulk of the US cases referred to earlier also support the view that speech can give rise to copyright works. The case going against the proposition, Falwell, has been authoritatively criticised, and seems inconsistent with the other authorities as well as basic principles of copyright law. And even Falwell is not categorically opposed to oral copyright; as Nimmer points out, 87 the judgment does refer cautiously to undefined 'narrow circumstances where a cause of action involving an oral expression can be sustained under a common law copyright theory'. 88 
B Originality
To receive the protection of copyright under UK law, a literary work must be 'original'. Just as the question of whether a work is 'literary' is determined irrespective of quality or style, 89 so the test of originality rejects any efforts to measure the quality or merit of a work before it can be protected, and depends most on a minimal level of independent (that is, not copied) skill and labour by the author of the work. While the routine words and catch phrases with which we navigate our way through daily life may well fall short of even such low standards of originality and literariness, a middle ground between such commonplaces and the full-blown lecture or speech can none the less be recognised, and it is here, it is suggested, that material emerging from interviews, commentaries and other impromptu and unscripted speech can often be located as original copyright works.
The issues involved here have again not received treatment in the British courts, but some of the difficulties which may be encountered come through in the Irish case of Gormley v EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd, 90 where the Supreme Court was applying legislation identical, at all relevant points, to the British Copyright Act 1956. The court's rejection of the claim to copyright was 86 See above, text accompanying note 9. 87 § 2.02, note 37.1. 88 521 F Supp at 1208. 89 [1916] 2 Ch 601, 608, per Peterson J. founded, not only on the lack of an immediately comprehensible material form for the work, but also on a finding that the girl's version of her story was not original in the sense required by copyright. She had been treating a story already in existence, and was trying, not to produce a new form of expressing the story, but to show that she knew it by faithfully reproducing what she had been told by her teacher (who had skilfully 'translated' difficult words and concepts such as 'ascension', 'resurrection' and 'Holy Ghost' to be comprehensible to very small children). The charm of the girl's Dublin accent -in particular, the way she pronounced the word 'certainly' -and her reference to Judas Iscariot as 'that dirty auld squealer' were not enough to give her work originality. She had copied what she had been told, and the manner of telling it, even though she had put the story in her own language. While a 6-year-old could exercise the independent thought, skill and labour needed to obtain a copyright, it was doubtful whether this would happen when her sole purpose was to repeat her teacher's story.
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But, as already noted, the result of the Gormley case seems hard in failing to recognise the degree to which an individual had been capitalised upon by others without her consent or any reward, and further return to the classic English judicial statement on the meaning of originality leaves doubts as to the approach of the Irish court, at least from a United Kingdom perspective:
The word 'original' does not in this connection mean that the work must be the expression of original or inventive thought. Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought … the Act does not require that the expression must be in original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work -that it should originate from the author. 91 90 [2000] 1 IR 74. 91 [1916] 2 Ch at 608.
The fact that, as the Irish court indicated, the girl in Gormley had put the stories told by her teacher into her own words should, it is suggested, have sufficed to meet the requirement of originality.
In the United States the standard of 'originality' was raised by the Supreme Court in Feist v Rural Telephone Service Company Inc 92 in 1991, post-dating most of the oral copyright cases already cited, although, importantly, not Nimmer's criticism of those cases for setting over-high standards of quality before oral works may enjoy copyright. Nimmer's comments suggest that Feist's recasting of the originality requirement, from a 'sweat of the brow' test to one of 'spark of creativity', should not be seen as supporting some minimum level of quality which most informal speech is likely to fall beneath. Feist was a case about the copyright in a telephone directory, in which it was held that the effort and resource needed to put together a list of subscribers to a telephone service and their addresses and numbers did not merit the protection of copyright, since arranging their surnames in alphabetical order lacked the minimum degree of creativity needed to constitute originality. But
Feist must be seen in the context of its own facts, namely the protection of a compilation or database. In this context, what copyright protects is, in the language of the Berne Convention, the 'selection and arrangement' of the contents of the work, and since all subscribers were included in the directory, and alphabetical listing was the only possible usable way of presenting the results, the originality of the selection and arrangement was indeed negligible. 93 Impromptu speech involving any degree of consideration or reflection by the speaker is almost certain to involve more originality than was apparent in the Feist case. 94 The case concerned the yellow pages section of a telephone directory, and again it was held that there was insufficient originality for copyright. But later the Hager court confined
The decision equivalent to Feist in Canada is
Tele-Direct to the compilation/database area, saying that difficulties arose there 'because such works are not likely to exhibit, on their face, indicia of the author's personal style or manner of expression'. 95 Tele-Direct has also been the subject of criticism by the Federal Court of Appeal in 96 while on appeal the Supreme Court took up a mid-position, emphasising that originality lay, not in either labour and 'sweat of the brow' or 'sparks of creativity', but in the author's exercise of skill and judgement. 97 There has been no decision in the United Kingdom directly equivalent to Feist, although in the artistic copyright case of Interlego v Tyco 98 the Privy Council held that skill and labour were not always enough for originality. Once more, however, context was important: the case was about artistic works, and the court took the example of tracing another's drawing to illustrate the case where there might be skill and labour but none the less no originality, and hence no copyright in the resulting work. The conclusion was that, since the 'third generation' Lego brick looked the same as its predecessors, no new artistic copyright came into existence, although the designers had put a great deal of skill and labour into non-visual aspects of the new brick such as its durability and flexibility. The case therefore does not say that skill and labour are insufficient for originality; rather, what is needed is relevant skill and labour. With regard to spoken works, there might well be skill and labour, but no new copyright, in simply repeating the words of another; but the situation with which this article is concerned is that of impromptu speech, whether in conversation with others or delivered as a monologue, and the modification of the skill and labour dimension of 94 
CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada,
B Fixation
The 1988 Act provides that copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or musical work unless and until it is recorded in writing or otherwise. 100 This is clearly crucial for the copyright in unscripted speech. Only when some record is made (fixation) does copyright come into existence.
With literary, dramatic and musical works, the traditional form of record has been writing, whether in print or otherwise. But writing is not the only possible method of recording literary, dramatic and musical works, nor does the 1988 Act so limit its requirement. 101 The electronic storage of work in digital form on discs and in computer memories is well known. So far as the spoken word goes, the tape and cassette recorder have been familiar for even longer, and film, 102 video and digital recording, including voice recognition software, can be added to the list of 
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evidence and proof of a work, rather than as a constitutive element of copyright itself.
B Authorship and ownership
In general, the author of a literary work is the first owner of the copyright in it, although if a literary work is created in the course of employment, copyright vests in the employer. 112 The author is the person who creates the work. 113 At first sight, it seems clear that with extempore speech the creator is the speaker, who is therefore first owner of the copyright in the words. But there are some difficulties in respect of interviews, where the interviewee's words are stimulated by the interviewer's questions, and the two sides of the conversation may be difficult to understand independently of each other.
The 1988 Act recognises works of joint authorship, where a work is produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of each author to the work is not distinct from that of the others. 114 Here copyright in the whole work is owned jointly by the authors. The essence of joint authorship is collaboration or cooperation between the authors in the execution of the work. 115 But it has been held in cases that where one person supplies ideas and information and another puts these into literary form, it is the latter who is author and owner of the copyright. 116 There may, however, be exceptional cases where the contribution of the person supplying material to the person actually executing the work is sufficient to allow a claim of copyright as either sole or joint author: that is to say, it goes beyond giving ideas to giving 112 CDPA 1988 1988, s 11(1), (2). 113 Ibid, s 9(1). 114 Ibid, s 10(1). 115 31 directions or instructions as to the mode of expression or execution. 117 A straightforward example would be where she is dictating to an amanuensis, in which case she is plainly the sole author. 118 David Vaver has suggested that 'any substantial intellectual contribution to a work's composition … should, in principle, count as co-authorship'. 119 US commentators have argued from a 'common law copyright' perspective that an interview gives rise to a joint copyright. 120 It is submitted, however, that in the UK, despite the intellectual symbiosis between the two sides of an interview or a conversation, what results is not a work of joint authorship under the 1988 Act's definition, because the respective contributions remain distinguishable as a matter of fact. Nor can the whole copyright be attributed to the interviewer, who may rather be compared with the supplier of ideas and information which stimulate, rather than direct or control, a responsive expression from the interviewee. Indeed, the interviewer's questions may be inspired by the interviewee's responses to earlier ones. What emerges from an interview is at least two works, each having an independent copyright: the component parts on each side may or may not have copyright in their own right, but the lack of copyright in some or other bit of the contribution need not prevent the whole having protection. 121 Each party is responsible for the expression of its own contribution, although undoubtedly the other's participation is essential to the process by which that expression was achieved. Its significance, however, does not extend to determining the way in which each party decides to express what he wants to say. Ultimately creation lies in the mind and mouth of the speaker, and accordingly that person is the sole author of what she says for the purposes of copyright.
A difficulty for this argument may seem to lie in the decision of the House of Lords in Walter v Lane, 122 as it has been interpreted in subsequent English and Canadian decisions. As already noted, Walter v Lane concerned the copyright in verbatim reports of five public speeches made by Lord Rosebery. The reports had been made by journalists and published in The Times newspaper. These reports had then been copied by the defendant without authorisation from The Times, in order to produce a book of Lord Rosebery's speeches. By a majority of 4-1, the House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, held that The Times had a copyright, even though the words recorded in the reports were entirely derived from Lord Rosebery, and that it was infringed by the defendant's publication.
The majority were clearly moved by a sense that the defendant was seeking to reap where he had not sown. The fact that he had corrected The Times reports from Lord Rosebery's album of corrected cuttings of the reports of his speeches was not enough to escape liability (only one of the five speeches had actually been so adjusted in the defendant's book). Another important feature of the case is that Lord Rosebery himself made no claim, so that his rights (if any) were not considered in detail. Moreover, his words were not the product of any interview, but were rather speeches made on public occasions, apparently with many journalists present. As a result of this public character of the speeches, the House of Lords was clearly of the view that Lord Rosebery had authorised the verbatim reporting and dissemination of his words, and had given up the common law right established in the earlier case of Caird v Sime 123 to prevent publication of a speech or lecture given on a private occasion.
The suggestion that Walter v Lane is no longer of authority, at least with regard to the reporter's copyright, because it was decided before the Copyright Act 1911 added a requirement of originality before a work could attract protection, has been rejected by English and Australian courts. 124 The case has come to have importance in the context of oral copyright as a result of However, the Vice-Chancellor equally clearly understood that the reporter's copyright was distinct from the copyright that Miss Ogilvy also enjoyed in her own words. In discussing and questioning the applicability in modern conditions of the case of Walter v Steinkopff, 127 in which North J had held that newspapers had no implied licence to reproduce verbatim reports which appeared in other newspapers, he noted that in that case the judge 'was not dealing with the use of quotations of words, being the words of a third party (for example, Miss Ogilvy) in whom the copyright of the words as opposed to the report of the words was vested.' 128 Thus, although there might now be a custom of the Press giving rise to an implied licence to reproduce each other's stories, 'it may well be that the case is different when the only relevant verbatim copying is not the copying of the reporter's words but the words of the interviewee.' 129 As already noted, the Canadian cases of Gould Estate v Stoddart Publishing Co, 130 and, in particular, Hager v ECW Press Ltd, 131 hold that the interviewers who had obtained and published the quotations from their subjects (respectively Glenn Gould and Shania Twain) own the whole copyright in the record of the material which they had procured, and that the interviewee had no copyright at all. This was particularly important in the Gould case, since it meant that the deceased interviewee's estate had no right to prevent the interviewer's reproduction of his words (in Hager, by contrast, Twain was not a party and her rights, like those of Lord Rosebery in Walter v Lane, were not in issue). Combined with the requirement of fixation, which is also found in Canadian law, the result of these two cases is, as David Vaver has put it, the marginalisation of those who provide the substance of the work (the interviewee), and the celebration of those who provide its routine form (whether writing or some other form of recording). 132 The result seems at odds with the support of the kind of individual creativity to which copyright offers protection.
In Hager Reed J supports his conclusion with quotations 133 138 Ibid, at 148. A 'release for publication' from the person quoted, falling short of an assignment, was held insufficient to give the plaintiff a copyright interest. Compare also Warwick Film Productions Ltd v Eisinger [1969] 1 Ch 508, a case on copyright in books on the trials of Oscar Wilde, in which it was held that an author could claim rights, not in those parts of his book which consisted of quotations from transcripts of the trials, but only in their collocation with other material in the book.thus consistent with the view that interviewees have copyright in their own words, independent of an interviewer's claims to any copyright that may exist in the questions.
A Conclusion
Arguments for the existence and, perhaps, extension of protection are somewhat unusual in current debates about copyright. Most discussion is more concerned to deplore the growth and expansion of copyright coverage, which is seen as driven predominantly by the commercial concerns of the entertainment and information industries, and as therefore requiring challenge to protect the interests of the consumer and user of the products of these industries. 142 This article argues, however, that, at least with regard to the spoken word, copyright can be an effective way to protect the legitimate interests of the individual, in particular interests in privacy and in ensuring that one's spontaneous or extemporary speech is not exploited for gain by others without consent.
At least four of the major acts restricted under the 1988 Act unless the copyright owner agrees to them seem particularly relevant to the interests of the speaker in the subsequent use of his or her words: (i) copying the work; (ii) issuing copies of the work to the public; (iii) performing, showing or playing the work in public; and (iv) the new public communication right introduced under the Copyright in the Information Society Directive 2001, which includes broadcasting the work or including it in a cable programme service. 143 The possibilities of the first of these rights are limited at present by the requirement that a spoken work must be recorded before it can be protected by copyright, so that the speaker has no protection against direct unauthorised recording as such; but the other four are all highly useful in the prevention of subsequent exploitation of such unauthorised recordings. In particular, the new public communication right will prove very helpful in tackling unauthorised dissemination of oral works on the Internet.
One of the difficulties in debating the legal protection of individual privacy is that the most obvious beneficiaries will be figures who are already well-known, whether as politicians, entertainers or media celebrities, and that the law will enable them to control or conceal information about themselves, mislead the public, and stifle the freedom of the press and of expression more generally. Yet, quite apart from the fact that even public figures may have a private life deserving of some protection from the curiosity of others, 144 however well-motivated, it is not clear that only such figures will be, or are, protected by copyright in speech. 145 A good example of a private individual who would have benefited from the recognition of a copyright in her words is the plaintiff in the Gormley case in Ireland.
The research upon which this article was initially based was triggered by consideration of the copyright position of oral historians and their interviewees, the latter being commonly private rather than public figures. Copyright does seem to provide useful guidance for both interviewer and interviewee in this context. By and large, it gives effect to the ethical concerns of those who work in this field, while not providing undue obstacles to the proper use of the rich historical resources available through the personal testimony of individuals. The interviewer is required to seek consent for the uses to which the interview will subsequently be put, and as a result the interviewee has the possibility of control over subsequent exploitation of her words. Moral rights give the interviewee a right to be identified, 146 with a concomitant right to be anonymous should the moral right be waived, 147 while the words of the interview must be treated with integrity; that is, in any subsequent treatment of the work, additions, deletions, alterations and adaptations which distort or mutilate the work, or are otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the speaker, constitute a wrong for which the owner of the moral right may recover damages. 148 Many of the organisations engaged in oral history work and the creation of sound archives already take quite elaborate precautions to obtain permissions from interviewees which cover those activities with the recording which fall within the scope of copyright. It is common practice for interviewers to ask the interviewee to complete and sign pre-prepared forms covering those aspects of copyright relevant to the ways in which the recording will be used subsequently. 149 It seems to be unusual for these forms to be outright assignations of the interviewee's copyright (in which case writing signed by the interviewee would be essential 150 ); instead they tend to be licences under Hemingway could readily be implied from the way the relationship had operated over several years. 151 A licence, it is suggested, is a much better explanation of the outcome of the Falwell case than the Virginia court's view that there could be no copyright in a conversation. As the court itself remarked:
[P]laintiff wilfully and freely participated in the interview. An interview with members of the media is not a private conversation. Like a press conference, plaintiff in this action responded to questions in a spontaneous manner and not from a carefully prepared text or even from notes. Moreover, plaintiff was aware that his comments were not made in the context of a private conversation but rather were destined expressly for dissemination to the public. 152 On the other hand, when Martin Luther King gave an advance press release of his 'I have a dream' speech, the licence to publish what he said was held to be limited to the period for which it was news, and was for news use only; the licence did not extend to commercial reproduction and sale of sound recordings of the speech. What can be implied as licensed from giving an oral history interview is much foggier, however, as many interviewees will only have the dimmest notions of 150 CDPA 1988, s 90(3). 151 Such licences may well be gratuitous and as a result, at any rate in English law, revocable until at least detrimental reliance from the licensee (see e.g. that some of the interview should not be published. 153 Some of the concern that oral copyright will give too much protection to public figures by enabling them censor-like powers to prevent publication of indiscreet comments or conversations potentially damaging to their political, commercial or other interests may be met through consideration of the fair dealing and other defences available under the copyright legislation, which are designed to facilitate access to, and use of, otherwise protected material. 154 The most obviously relevant is fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events, 155 which the courts have sought to interpret liberally, especially from the point of view of what events are current. 156 The public interest defence in copyright has also been given some cautious support by the courts, 157 although it is no longer clear how far it survives the apparent restriction of copyright exceptions from 31 October 2003 to those laid down by the regulations implementing the
